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THE TRINITY AND EXTENDED SIMPLES
Martin Pickup

In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended
simples that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools
developed to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual
distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune.
Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might
surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other
incoherent.

In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended
simples. In doing so, I hope to shed some light on the philosophical problems of Trinitarian doctrine and suggest a tentative way to address the core
of them. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and debate extended
simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue,
can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand
what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between
extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some who find one of
these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent.
In order to show connections between these seemingly disparate topics,
I shall first briefly introduce the notion of extended simples before, in the
next section, outlining the core contemporary philosophical problem of
the Trinity. In the later parts of the paper, I’ll then apply the conceptual
resources provided by extended simples to the specified Trinitarian
problem.
Extended simples, as might be expected, are entities that are both extended and simple. They are extended in the sense of occupying regions of
space and they are simple in the sense of having no parts. So, to speak more
colloquially, extended simples are objects which are spread out in space
but which do not have any bits to them.1
1
I will speak of space rather than spacetime in what follows, though everything I will
say is translatable into spacetime terminology. I do so simply to avoid complications (especially regarding the relationship between the temporal axis of spacetime (in a given reference
frame) and time itself).
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Extended simples would be strange, and there is a discussion in the
metaphysics literature about whether or not they are possible. For how
can something that is extended not be made up of parts? Even proponents
of the possibility of extended simples will admit that this is strange. The
strangeness comes from the fact that the parthood relations are different
for the entity and its location: the simple entity has no parts but the region
the extended object occupies does have parts.2 Thus, the mereological structure of extended simples comes apart from the mereological structure of
the spatial regions they occupy. I submit that this is the source of (at least
some of) the strangeness of extended simples; a dissonance introduced by
the structural difference between entities and their locations.
Defenders of the possibility of extended simples point out that just
because this is strange doesn’t make it impossible, and that there is no obvious contradiction in the notion of something occupying complex spatial
regions but having no parts. In other words, these metaphysicians claim
that for at least some possible objects, their mereological structure and
the structure of their location are not aligned.3 The possibility of extended
simples would therefore demonstrate that the mereological structures of
these two are at least logically independent. It is this distinction, between
the structures of entities and of their locations, that I want to exploit in
presenting an analogy between extended simples and the doctrine of the
Trinity. But before discussing the analogy, we should set out clearly the
problem to address.
1. The Problem of the Trinity
The doctrine of the Trinity is a claim about what God is. It is a claim that
God is, in some sense, three, and, in some sense, one. It is a doctrine with
a long and intricate history. The scriptural evidence, the early church
discussions, and later debates have all contributed to the doctrine. It is
contentious how, precisely, we should understand it. Nevertheless, in contemporary philosophical discussion of the doctrine, we can identify a core
question: how can God be both three and one?
Any account of the Trinity faces this difficulty. To give an example of a
text that gives rise to these worries, consider part of the Athanasian Creed:
[W]e worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding
the Persons: nor dividing the Substance. For there is one Person of the Father,
2
This characterisation might be resisted if we can make sense of a region of space that
does not contain parts. If so, an entity could be extended in virtue of occupying a region
without thereby having a mereologically complex location. But it is natural to characterise
regions in mereological terms, whereby a region is mereologically complex and contains
points of space as parts. So an alternative, non-mereological account of what it is to be a
region would need to be provided before we can develop this thought further. Thanks to
Mark Murphy for noticing this.
3
Some objects may inherit their structure from their location, and vice versa. Such objects
necessarily have the same structure as their locations. The claim here is that not all objects
and their locations are like this. (See Saucedo, “Parthood and Location,” for a discussion of
various ways that objects and their locations can fail to align.)
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another of the Son: and another of the Holy Ghost . . . So the Father is God,
the Son is God: and the Holy Ghost is God.4

A prima facie reading of Athanasian text would propose that each of the
Father, Son and Spirit are God, but that they are distinct. It is this contention that is the typical starting point for the contemporary philosophical
discussion.5 Of course, there is a good doctrinal question about whether
this is the right way to understand the various creedal claims, but this is not
one I’ll consider here. Rather, I want to see whether extended simples can
help with what we might call the “philosophers’” problem of the Trinity.
So, what is this problem? Well, a straightforward way of understanding
that the Father, Son and Spirit are God but that they are distinct is that:
(1) The Father is God
(2) The Son is God
(3) The Holy Spirit is God
And also that:
(4) The Father is not the Son
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
The problem is that, if we read the “is” in each case as an “is” of identity,
we have the resulting claims (where F, S, H and G abbreviate their obvious
candidates):
(7) F = G
(8) S = G
(9) H = G
(10) F ≠ S
(11) F ≠ H
(12) S ≠ H
But by the transitivity and symmetry of identity,
(13) F = S
(14) F = H
(15) S = H
4
This is the Book of Common Prayer’s translation. Note that Eastern Church Christians
don’t typically accept the Athanasian Creed, but the core problem I identify is shared never
theless.
5
Michael Rea, in his chapter “The Trinity,” 403–404 states that this is called the “the logical
problem of the Trinity” by philosophers and “the threeness-oneness problem” by theologians. As a couple of examples, the problem is set out this way by Kleinschmidt, “Many-One
Identity and the Trinity,” and by Howard-Snyder, in his introductory entry “Trinity.”
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Any of these three provides a contradiction with one of (10) – (12). This is
the core contemporary philosophical problem.6
One solution to this problem is to toy with identity so that a contradiction cannot be derived from (7) – (12). An obvious way of doing so is to
deny either the transitivity or the symmetry of identity. But this is massively controversial: any relation that is not both transitive and symmetric
doesn’t seem to be identity. Another suggestion along these lines is the
relative identity view, according to which we should understand identity as
(in at least some cases) being with respect to a particular sortal.7 According
to such a view, (7) – (12) are incomplete because they do not specify the
sortal under which the terms fall. A relative identity theorist might therefore hope that holding the sortal terms fixed avoids a contradiction. I don’t
favour a relative identity view: any sort of adjustments to or complications of identity are liable to serious objection. But I will not here try to
substantiate such objections. Instead, for reasons of space, I’ll simply set
this alternative aside.
If we accept the canonical account of identity, then, (7) – (12) does indeed lead to contradiction. We must therefore find a reason to deny that
all of (7) – (12) are the appropriate translations of (1) – (6). But then the task
is to say which are inappropriate and why, whilst maintaining a view that
can faithfully be called Trinitarian.
There are two broad approaches to this. The first takes (7) – (9) to be
inappropriate translations of (1) – (3) and the second takes (10) – (12) to be
inappropriate translations of (4) – (6). The first approach emphasises the
distinctness of the Persons, the second approach emphasises the unity of
God. These two different ways of proceeding are sometimes called the
Greek and Latin approaches to the Trinity, respectively (though the historical aptness of these designations is not certain8). This paper will take
the second way, that of trying to account for the distinctness of the Father,
Son and Holy Spirit without translating this into the definitive denial of
numerical identity. The reason I do so is simply that I find the criticisms
of the Greek approach convincing.9 But I do not have space to argue this
here. Thus, I will be exploring a Latin Trinitarian view, as advocated in
this journal and elsewhere by Brian Leftow.10 The paper can therefore be
6
By this, I do not mean to suggest that it is the most important or difficult problem associated with the Trinity, but rather that it is in some sense the most primitive: if we can’t fix this
problem there’s just a contradiction being expressed.
7
For discussion, see Rea, “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity.” A sortal is a
kind term for some countable kind. “Chicken,” “statue,” and “molecule” are examples of
sortals.
8
See Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism: Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations” for a
discussion of this.
9
There is much written both in favour of and against the Greek or “social” account of
the Trinity. The McCall and Rea collection, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity,
especially Part 1, is a good place to begin, and William Hasker’s recent book length treatment
in his Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God is a prominent defence.
10
Leftow, “A Latin Trinity.”
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seen as a way of spelling out the Latin approach, and suggesting reasons
to think it plausible. The comparative task of assessing the costs and benefits of the Latin approach versus the alternatives will have to wait for
another day.
As I am taking a Latin view, I will be examining the translatability of
(4) – (6) into (10) – (12). I will deny that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are
numerically distinct entities. But this seems to spell trouble: the Father,
Son and Holy Spirit are supposed to be persons, and different persons.
How can this be compatible with them not being numerically distinct
entities? We need to find a way to model the fact that they are numerical
identical as God, but still hold onto some version of the assertion that they
are distinct persons. It is here that I believe the analogy with extended
simples can help us.
2. The Analogy between Extended Simples and the Trinity
Recall that in the case of extended simples, the structure of space and
the structure of the entity come apart. With this in mind, my core claim
can now be stated rather briefly: in the divine the “substance-structure”
described by the statements of identity above, (1) – (3), comes apart from
the “person-structure” of the statements of the distinctions between the
Persons of the Trinity, (4) – (6). These scare quotes indicate that there is further explaining to do. But we can immediately note that the relationships
between the Father, Son and Spirit are to be analogous to the relationships
between the spatial regions that an extended simple occupies, while the
relationships between each of Father, Son and Spirit and God are to be
analogous to the relationships between the entities located at the regions
an extended simple occupies, viz. identity. The “person-structure” and the
“substance-structure” of the divine are not isomorphic, in much the same
way that the location structure and mereological structure of extended
simples are not isomorphic.11
Of course, this claim needs to be spelt out in much more detail. The
“substance-structure” I am appealing to should be easily comprehensible: it is standard identity. There are numerous questions about identity
but these are not peculiar to the Trinity: the identity of the Father, Son
and Spirit with God should be understandable. The real work to do in
explaining this analogy is to make clear what is meant by the “personstructure” of the Father, Son and Spirit. In the analogy, this corresponds to
11
I will discuss in more detail below how the “person-structure” and “substance-structure” of the divine come apart. It’s worth flagging here, though, that although extended
simples are easily understood on a substantivalist view of space, where space is something
over and above its occupants, substantivalism is not necessary for extended simples. For
an anti-substantivalist view of space might still hold that space can be constructed on the
basis of the best systematisation of distance relations between entities, and on this basis
some simple entity might be multiply located in space. Such an entity would have distance
relations to other objects that are inconsistent with its occupying a single point of space. So
space’s being relational doesn’t entail that the location and mereological structure of entities
must align. Thanks to David Glick for discussion on this, which was an issue raised by a
reviewer.
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the complex location of the extended simple or, in other words, the spatial
regions occupied by the simple entity.
What we need, then, is a notion of “person-space” and of the occupancy
of this space by entities. I will be thinking of the Persons of the Trinity
on a model of actual and possible persons: though arguably theologically
naïve, if we can make sense of the Trinity using these naïve tools then
there is at least one way to make sense of the doctrine. Furthermore, there
is no obvious reason why any sophisticated theological use of “Person”
would make issues for what is to come.
Although our primitive notion of a “space” is derived from the space
that material objects occupy, we can formalise a number of other spaces
for other purposes. For instance, in physics the configuration space of
a system describes all the possible states in which the system can be. In
other words, it is the range of all the possible configurations of the system.
A point in the space corresponds to a particular configuration of the entire system. Configuration space is a space with more dimensions that
the three of physical space, and can have certain mathematical and geometrical properties (including distance relations). A more philosophical
example is the space of possibility per se.12 Using Lewisian modal realism
as an explanatory short cut, we can generate a space of possibility by
taking each point of the space to correspond to a way for the world to be
(i.e., a possible world). The space of possibility describes how actuality
might be. For Lewis, distance relations can be defined on this space according to relative similarity between worlds.
Importantly, we can choose to introduce spaces as we find them useful.
As an example, I propose a new notion: taste-space. I can stipulate that
this is the space that describes all possible tastes. A point in taste-space
corresponds to a way for something to taste. Tastes that are more similar
will be closer to each other in this space. It is reasonable to think that
overall tastes involve the relative amount and balance of more primitive
tastes like saltiness, sweetness, acidity, spiciness etc. These more primitive
tastes can therefore provide the axes of this space, allowing distance relations to be defined on the space. The example of taste-space shows that
we can describe certain features of the world or of our experiences using
spatial analogues, with associated benefits of formalisation.
The notion of space, then, seems sufficiently flexible to permit us to
introduce spaces if they will be useful. I want to introduce a particular
space I’ll call person-space: the space of possible persons. This space is
made up of points, and occupying a certain point in person-space is being
a certain possible person. Distances between points in person-space report
how alike persons are: these distance relations can be brute or depend on
certain more primitive axes of similarity. Thus, two entities that are similar

12
Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Tractatus, 1.13 of logical space is an important precursor
to philosophical use of spatial concepts, and my thanks to Brian Leftow for noting this.
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people will occupy nearer points of person-space than two entities that are
very different people.
But what is person-space? To begin to answer this, I will first give some
examples to get a grip on how the concept is supposed to work. So, consider some entities and their occupation of person-space: I occupy exactly
one point in person-space; Hillary Clinton occupies exactly one point in
person-space; I do not have a sister, but if I did my sister would occupy
exactly one point in person-space (cashing out this “would” will connect
to questions about the existential status of merely possible entities); the
milk in the fridge occupies no location in person-space as it is not a person.
These are the easy examples, where the points of person-space have at
most one occupant and the entities occupy at most one point of personspace. But there are also interesting examples where this seems not to be
the case. I’ll spend a little while discussing these.
First, imagine a football team on a pitch. Grant that we can consider the
team as a whole, i.e., as a single thing.13 There is a natural metaphysical
carving of this whole into eleven parts, namely into the eleven players.
The team has the mereological structure of having eleven parts. Each of
these parts occupies a single point in person-space, as each of the players
is a person. These points are different, of course. I suggest we think of
the whole team, which is composed of these eleven players, as having
a location in person-space too. In particular, I propose it is extended in
person-space by occupying the eleven points of person-space that are the
locations of its parts.14 The team is spread out in person-space across all
and only the points that its parts occupy. The football team is therefore an
example of something occupying multiple points of person-space. In such
a case, the mereology and person-structure of the team are aligned: there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the points of person-space the
team occupies and its parts.
The concept of person-space allows us to describe some more contentious examples too. In the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, it seems that
there are two people in one body. This can be captured using personspace: in the story there is one entity occupying two distinct points of
person-space (using the term “entity” here deliberately avoids the difficult issue of what exactly is the thing that is two persons). I also want to
note, tentatively, that this might be an accurate description of some individuals diagnosed with Dissociative Identity Disorders (previously called
Multiple Personality Disorders). Perhaps in such circumstances there is a
13
Perhaps it is asking too much to grant that a football team can be considered as a single
thing. I suspect if one will not grant this, other examples I would appeal to (such as families,
committees, or bands) will be no more persuasive. Though it will be helpful for my later
discussion if we already have cases where things are extended in person-space, if these cases
are not accepted it doesn’t rule out the divine as a sui generis entity with extension in such a
space.
14
This might follow straightforwardly given certain principles governing how and when
wholes inherit properties of their parts. But I won’t explore this here, as the example is
simply indicative.
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single entity occupying distinct points of person-space. I do not wish to
take a stand on these real life cases, though they are suggestive.
The last couple of paragraphs have pointed to cases where it seems that
things occupy more than one point of person-space. Another interesting
issue is whether two entities can occupy exactly the same point in personspace. This is the question of whether two distinct things could both be a
certain person. Esoteric cases involving clones or time-travellers might be
examples of this. Suppose, for instance, that Alice time-travels to a point
in her past. Perhaps the right way to understand this is that at that time
there are two distinct things (young Alice and old Alice) which are the
same person. Of course, what to say in such situations is controversial and
depends on one’s views of the persistence of objects and persons through
time. But points of person-space being multiply occupied is one alternative.
A different case where we might want multiple occupation of points of
person-space is qualitative identity. Suppose two entities are qualitatively
indistinguishable regarding all properties that relate to personhood. Does
this entail that they occupy the same point of person-space? This is the
question whether two entities that are exactly similar in this respect are
in fact the same person.15 No particular answer to the question is needed
for the notion of person-space I will use. But discussing these questions
through the lens of person-space highlights them and helps us to see how
person-space works.
Finally, let me flag another interesting question. Can entities move
through person-space? We can imagine such a possibility in the following way: suppose that an entity changes which person it is across
time (for simplicity, in a smooth and continuous way across a fixed axis
in person-space). In such a case, it seems that the entity would trace a line
in person-space. Of course, this requires that it is not essential to an entity
that it is a particular person. Note, though, that if we add a temporal axis
into person-space so that the points correspond to being a certain person
at a certain time, every entity that is a person for more than an instant will
occupy multiple points of person-space.
The discussion of the above strange cases is helpful to get a sense of the
flexibility of the notion of person-space. There are decisions to make about
it. Some of these decisions will depend on what we think is possible for
persons and for entities. I’ve deliberately avoided taking a view on this.
The use of person-space, however, allows us to tease apart the relevant
questions.
Another decision, though, is one about which I will specify a preference. This concerns the ontological status of person-space. The central
issue is whether person-space is anything over and above the occupants
thereof and their properties and relations. In other words, should we be
15
Another way to frame this issue, suggested by a reviewer, is whether the modal facts
from which the points of person-space are abstracted include “thisness” facts. For what it’s
worth, I am inclined to view person-space as purely qualitative, and hence permit multiple
occupation of points of it by entities exactly similar in ways relevant to personhood.
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substantivalist or anti-substantivalist about person-space? Compare this
with substantivalist and anti-substantivalist views of space itself: the
former hold that space and its points are in the fundamental ontology of
reality while the latter suggest that their existence is merely derivative.
There are similar issues concerning the ontological status of configuration space and modal space. In each of these three cases, there is ongoing
and well-documented disagreement.16 Above, I introduced the notion of
taste-space. It seems much less contentious what the ontological status
of taste-space is: it is naturally thought of as no more than the possible
tastes and their relationships. We should be anti-substantivalist about
taste-space.
I also prefer an anti-substantivalist view of person-space. I take it that
person-space is nothing over and above the entities occupying it and their
properties and relations. I prefer this view because I do not wish my use
of person-space to add to my fundamental ontology. I will therefore be
using an anti-substantivalist account of person-space in what follows. It is
open to others, however, to develop my account of the Trinity in line with
a substantivalist account of person-space.
Given an anti-substantivalist approach to person-space, some more
metaphysics can be given for person-space. I take person-space to be an abstraction of the facts about possible personhood. It is thus a formalisation
of certain group of modal facts.17 I therefore take it to be merely a way of
presenting some pre-existing claims: it does not add anything metaphysically speaking.18 Though it may serve as a clarification and rigidification
of personhood facts, it does not add to the ontological ingredients of the
world. Person-space as a whole, which considers all possible persons,
16
For discussion of the ontological priority of configuration space and connected issues,
see Ney, “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence” and
for discussion of the ontological status of possible worlds the classic text is Lewis, On the
Plurality of Worlds.
17
If the reader is uncomfortable with modal facts, or indeed facts in general, we can be
deflationary here: simply insert for “modal facts” whatever it is that does this role in your
metaphysics.
18
The editor, Mark Murphy, has raised the following problem: if person-space is not substantive, isn’t my argument that follows simply a reformulation of pre-existing claims in the
doctrine? In other words, if I don’t make any distinctive claims about what it is to be a person
(i.e., occupy a point of person-space) or posit person-space to be an additional ontological
ingredient, what more am I saying than that God is Father, Son and Spirit?
I think this is a good challenge. I have two replies. Firstly, I’m certainly not trying to say
something that is different to the doctrine, and perhaps not much beyond the doctrine. So
I’m reasonably happy if the position is a reformulation of that doctrine, albeit hopefully more
precise in certain ways. Secondly, the reformulation of the doctrine in these terms allows us
to see the conceptual space between being a certain person and being a certain entity that,
I think, the doctrine tacitly relies upon. That is, my discussion can show the coherence of the
pre-existing claims, a coherence that becomes apparent by the reformulation. The reformulation permits distinctions between different structures that were previously obscured. These
distinctions show how the Trinitarian position is not contradictory in the way outlined in §1.
Further, the analogy with extended simples suggests that philosophers in other areas
are willing to countenance very similar moves. So the use of person-space may still be
dialectically helpful even if, on my deflationary understanding, it doesn’t add content to the
Trinitarian claims.
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covers all of the range of possibilities for personhood and is thus exhaustive. Points of this space are thus to be thought of as specific possibilities
for personhood. In particular, a point of person-space is a representation
of a group of properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for being
a certain possible person. So a particular point corresponds to a particular
possible person and distinct points of the space represent distinct possible
persons. I wish to be deflationary, too, about points of person-space. They
are not additions to the ontology but structures to describe and formalise
certain pre-existing specific claims about personhood. Both for personspace in general and for points of person-space in particular, therefore,
I do not wish to be committed to anything beyond a formalisation of our
independently motivated theories what it is to be a person and to be a
specific person.19
The final issue to address in this section is how persons and personspace are related. I have said above that the occupation of a point of
person-space by something is that thing being the corresponding person.
It is things that are people: the points of person-space correspond to
the ways that things can be people. Person-space is thus a description
of the range of possibilities for things in the domain of personhood. We
might say that person-space is the personal possibilities for things quite
generally.20 A person, therefore, is something occupying a point of personspace. When something occupies a point of person-space, it is the relevant
person. Person-space is the abstract representation of what it is to be all
actual and possible persons.
This concludes the introduction to person-space. It is a space produced
from the facts about possible personhood and describes the ways things
could be persons. Points in person-space are occupied by things, and
this occupation amounts to that thing being that person. Typically, we
consider things that occupy just one point of person-space, but we have
also considered putative cases where the occupation of points of personspace by entities is more complicated. For instance, the football team and
Jekyll/Hyde cases might suggest that things can occupy multiple points
of person-space, while the time-travel case might suggest that points of
person-space can be occupied by multiple entities. In what follows, I will
use the notion of person-space and, specifically, its multiple occupation to
19
I wish to flag something here that will be important for later discussion. I take personspace to be a mechanism for formalising claims about personhood, without adding anything
ontologically or metaphysically serious. But being deflationary about person-space and its
points is not being deflationary about the personhood facts. Although person-space is not
fundamental in the sense that it describes pre-existing claims, this does not mean that those
claims themselves are not fundamental. By reducing person-space to facts about possible
persons, I do not mean to reduce the facts about possible persons to anything else. This is
important for my response to the threat of modalism, and will be mentioned again later in
the paper.
20
This is not to say that any particular thing can occupy any particular point of personspace: it would seem extremely natural to assert that there are constraints on the range of
points that particular things might occupy. But person-space gives us the range of possible
ways that any thing can be a person.
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draw the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity. In doing so I
attempt to solve the problems the latter faces.
3. The Solution to the Problem
I claim that the divine occupies multiple locations of person-space. More
precisely, I claim that the single and simple entity that is God is located
at three distinct points of person-space. Unlike the case of the football
team above, God does not occupy three distinct points of person-space by
having as parts three distinct entities occupying those points. Rather, one
and the same God has a location in person-space three times over. God is
a simple extended in person-space. Some notation will be helpful here. I’ll
translate “entity a is person P” as “a occupies point p of personal space.”
For every P, there is a corresponding p. Thus, I claim that God occupies
three points of person-space, which we can call f, s, and h. By being at f,
God is the Father. By being at s, God is the Son. By being at h, God is the
Holy Spirit. The same entity occupies these three points of person-space,
so there is only one divine entity. But the distinct points of person-space
correspond to distinct persons, so there are three divine persons. This allows us to say that there is only one God, but three persons.
This is the central idea. But we now need to show exactly how it solves
the problem outlined above when introducing the doctrine of the Trinity.
What would this mean for the statements (1) – (12)? Let us consider them
in turn.
(1) The Father is God
(2) The Son is God
(3) The Holy Spirit is God
(1) – (3) refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and say of them that they
are God. Using the notion of personal space introduced above, I gloss
these as follows:
(1′) The occupant of f is God
(2′) The occupant of s is God
(3′) The occupant of h is God
In other words, the terms “the Father,” “the Son,” and “the Holy Spirit”
in (1) – (3) I take to refer to the entity occupying the relevant points of personal space. Thus, following the extended simple analogy, we can say that
they refer to one and the same entity, namely God. This means that their
translation into the identity statements below is appropriate:
(7) F = G
(8) S = G
(9) H = G
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F, S, H and G here all denote entities (in fact, they all denote one and the
same entity). So we can retain (7) – (9) on the interpretation I am offering.
What about the second set of statements derived from the doctrine?
These are below:
(4) The Father is not the Son
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
Now, we know that the entities involved in these statements are all the
single divine entity. Hence we should not interpret these as the denial of the
identity claims about entities. In other words, we do not want to accept the
translation of (4) – (6) into the following claims of numerical distinctness:
(10) F ≠ S
(11) F ≠ H
(12) S ≠ H
But we do want to maintain that the persons of the Trinity are distinct as
persons. What this means is that there are three points of person-space,
not one, occupied by the divine entity. Thus, (4) – (6) should be interpreted
as claims about the structure of the person-space occupied by God, not
as claims about the structure of the identity relations that hold within the
Godhead. (4) – (6) should be glossed as:
(4′) f is not s
(5′) f is not h
(6′) s is not h
Of course, all of these are true: these are indeed distinct points in personspace. But (4′) – (6′), which refer to points of person-space, clearly do not
entail (10) – (12), which refer to entities. We are not therefore required to
hold (10) – (12), which generate a contradiction via the transitivity and reflexivity of identity. Rather, we can say of the points of person-space:
(10′) f ≠ s
(11′) f ≠ h
(12′) s ≠ h
But, of course, these do not create a contradiction with (7) – (9). This is how
the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity is supposed to shed
light on the latter: by distinguishing between the structures of personspace and entities we can give grounds for the claim that (10) – (12) are not
the appropriate translations of (4) – (6) and offer alternatives.
The contention of the analogy, therefore, is this: being a certain entity
and being a certain person are not the same thing, even if that entity is
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that person. These are conceptually distinct, and so being a certain entity
and being a certain person are distinguishable. Even if typically entities
and persons are matched one-to-one, it is conceptually possible that they
are not. This conceptual possibility is actual in the case of the divine: the
Persons of the Trinity are the very same entity but there really are three Persons. The analogy with extended simples shows how such structures can
be distinguished, and the mechanisms by which to express the conceptual
possibilities involved. God occupies three distinct points of person-space
but is a single entity. I thus argue that the Latin Trinitarian approach can
maintain the appropriate sense of the distinctness of the Persons.
4. Responses to Worries
There are a number of worries that might arise from the preceding argument. Here I want to anticipate some of them.
Modalism
The first concern is the ever-present one for Trinitarian thought that emphasises the unity of the Godhead: modalism. Modalism is a view that is
explicitly ruled out by the doctrinal constraints, so my picture cannot be a
form of modalism on pain of radical revisionism. I will take modalism to
be the claim that God’s three-ness is not fundamental. Or, to put it differently, a modalist view is one that claims that God is Father, Son and Spirit
only in some derivative sense. In particular, views according to which the
Persons are not eternal, necessary, or internal to God are modalist. A standard modalist view is that the Persons are simply different roles God can
play in relation to us, but any account that takes the Persons to be in any
way derivative should be counted as modalist.21 Modalism denigrates the
Persons of the Trinity: it maintains that at the deepest metaphysical and
theological level, God is not triune.
The view I present is not a version of modalism. This is because God’s
being the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is fundamental, not derivative.
God’s being Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is modelled by a single entity
occupying multiple locations in person-space. The model expresses a fundamental fact about the personhood-structure of God. God’s occupancy
of distinct regions of person-space is a fact at the most primitive metaphysical and theological level. God is fundamentally, not derivatively,
three persons.
This is so even on the anti-substantivalist account of person-space that
I advocate.22 My deflationary approach to person-space states that it is
nothing over and above the entities that are persons and their properties and relations. As I described it above, it is a systematisation of the
facts about possible personhood. Because I am anti-substantivalist about
21
This typical view is probably akin to the views of Sabellius, who was the figure against
whom responses to modalism were first formulated.
22
See also n19.
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person-space, this space is not fundamental. But the facts that it systematises are. The fact that God is the person of the Father is fundamental
whatever view we have of the ontological status of person-space. Whether
or not an entity is a particular person is a different question to whether
or not person-space is anything more that entities and their properties
and relations. The facts about God’s personhood are fundamental regardless of the fundamentality of person-space as an independent item of our
ontology.
Worries about the fundamentality of God’s three-fold personhood can
also be assuaged when we notice that the Father is (at least) as much a
person as I am. The relationship between the entity God and the person
of the Father is the same as the relationship between the entity that is the
person I am and the person that I am. The occupancy of the relevant point
in person-space is not different in any important way between the case of
the Father (or the Son, or the Holy Spirit) and the case of other persons.
God the Father is a full person, and fully. The view I am advocating takes
nothing away from the Father’s personhood. To make this clear, compare
it with the extended simple case: the simple entity really is located at certain points of space. Its location at the points it occupies is not derivative,
nor is it less complete than the location of any other object at the point or
points it occupies. The extended simple is not in space in a less profound
sense than anything else is. Likewise, God the Father is not a person in a
less profound sense than a non-divine person is.
Unpalatable Theological Consequences
Even if the threat of modalism is countered, there are other theological
issues that can be raised. An important one is that there still seem to be
worrying statements that come out true on my account and appear to conflict with the doctrine. My solution holds that the Father, Son and Spirit
are, strictly speaking, numerically identical (understanding these terms as
referring to the entity that occupies the relevant portions of person-space).
But doesn’t the doctrine require that the Persons are simply numerically
distinct? My response is that the Persons are distinct, when “the Persons”
has a certain reference (to points of person-space). But the Persons are also
not distinct, when this refers to the divine entity. It isn’t clear to me that
the doctrine and tradition require that the entity that is each Person be
numerically distinct. If it did, wouldn’t that simply equate to tritheism?
I take the project of philosophical reflection on the Trinity to be to find
ways to uphold the core of the doctrine without leading to contradiction.
This might require some accommodation or interpretation of the doctrinal
claims. I do not wish to dwell on the question of whether the Latin-style
version of Trinitarianism is theologically acceptable: there is enough to
read on this question already. But, to put it simply, I don’t accept that
having numerically distinct entities corresponding to the Persons is a theological requirement that can be drawn from the core claims outlined in
§1. God being Father, Son, and Spirit doesn’t entail that there are three
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divine entities. Those who disagree are unfortunately not going to accept
the model I here offer of the Trinity, but it is their task to show how the
core claims lead to numerically distinct entities referred to by the Persons.
However, there may be further statements that my position is committed to that might be worrying:
(i) “The Father is numerically identical to the Son” is a literal truth
when “The Father” and “The Son” have the very same referents
they have in the truths “The Father is God” and “The Son is God.”
(ii) “The Spirit is three persons” is a literal truth when “the Spirit” has
the very same reference it has in the truth “The Spirit is God.”
I am committed to these statements, and I do think they prima facie sound
bad. But reflection makes this prima facie impression much weaker. The
Latin Trinitarian view as I construe it is required to assent to such claims.
But given the ambiguity involved in the Person-terms and the fact that
the terms are being deliberately disambiguated in unfamiliar ways in the
contexts of (i) and (ii), I don’t believe it is unacceptable for these statements to be true. If we substitute “the entity which occupies the point of
person-space x” for the relevant terms, the resulting claims seem more
palatable, even though they are equivalent. This indicates that the unusual
use of the terms in the context might be generating a reasonable amount
of the discomfort.
In sum, then, I do recognise that some unfamiliar claims will come out
true on the interpretation I am proposing of the doctrine of the Trinity. But
these unfamiliar claims are not unacceptable, and do not therefore rule
out the interpretation.23
Indiscernibility and Identity
If we accept the identities asserted in (7) – (9), then the Father, the Son and
the Holy Spirit are numerically identical, where these terms refer to the
entity located at the relevant portions of person-space. But this seems to
suggest that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be indiscernible, for a
well-established law governing identity is the indiscernibility of identicals: when a = b then a and b share all and only the same properties (and
relations). This is a problem for the doctrine of the Trinity because the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are supposed to share only almost all the same
properties. In particular, they are supposed to vary in at least the relations
of origin.24 The Son is begotten by the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds
from the Father (Eastern tradition) or the Father and the Son (Western tra23
My thanks to one of the reviewers for raising the issue tackled in this section, which also
required revising the scope of the paper, and to Brian Leftow for discussion.
24
There are also other properties that seem true of one of the Persons and not another. For
instance, it could be argued that (while incarnate) the Son doesn’t know everything that the
Father does. I can’t enter into this debate here. But what I say about the relations of origin
will generalise, if necessary: I therefore focus on this particular example from here on.
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dition). Thus, it seems that the Father has a property of begetting the Son,
which neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit do. This appears a violation of
the indiscernibility of identicals, and hence to prove that the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit cannot be numerically identical entities after all. To sum up
the problem: the identity of the occupants of the distinct points of personspace seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities across this
space. But, in fact, the doctrine requires that there is such variation.
Luckily, the analogy with the extended simple case provides help here
once more. When they were introduced above, I said nothing about the
properties of extended simples. We might naturally think that extended
simples have to be qualitatively identical at any location at which they
exist, i.e., they must be the same across the space they occupy. Interestingly, this is not a constraint that has been readily adopted in the literature.
In fact, it is a common view that extended simples can be heterogeneous:
that they can have different properties at the different locations at which
they exist.25 This causes a problem for the defenders of heterogeneous extended simples that is parallel to the problem just outlined for the Latin
Trinitarian: the numerical identity of the occupants of the distinct points
of physical space seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities
across this space.
This problem has been noted and discussed in the case of extended
simples. A number of different solutions to the problem are available.
I believe these solutions can be used to give analogous solutions to the
problem in the case of the Trinity. To argue this, I’ll first focus on one solution, which I prefer for both problems. But I’ll then briefly indicate how
we might translate the alternatives from the extended simples literature to
the context of the Trinity.
My favoured approach in both cases is to appeal to certain sorts of
properties: fundamental distributional properties. A distributional property is a property that grants to its bearer a qualitative variation across
a particular dimension.26 Typical examples given involve colour: being
speckled and being polka-dotted, for instance, are colour properties that
grant variation in colour across space upon their bearers. A speckled hen
exhibits colour variation across her body by being speckled. A non-colour
25
Those who allow for heterogeneous extended simples include Parsons, “Distributional
Properties,” Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People,” and McDaniel, “Extended
Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity.” Certain existence monists, who believe that there is
only one thing and that it is simple, would presumably also subscribe to variation across that
thing (as does Schaffer in, “From Nihilism to Monism”). Of course, heterogeneous extended
simples are not without their detractors, e.g., Spencer, “A Tale of Two Simples.”
A prima facie reason to think such variation over space can be argued for is the analogy to the
problem of temporary intrinsics, where a parallel indiscernibility of identicals challenge is
raised for objects enduring (i.e., being numerically identical) despite variation over time. But
I cannot make this argument here and will simply assume the possibility of heterogeneous
extended simples.
26
Parsons, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” and his “Distributional Properties” introduce these properties.
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example might be turbulence: by being turbulent, a fluid varies in its flow
across space. There are many further examples of such properties, and
their existence is not controversial. What is contentious, however, is the
further claim that some distributional properties are fundamental. That
is, the claim that some distributional properties are such that they cannot
be decomposed into any collection of other non-distributional properties.
If this is so, then there are some properties that simply confer on their
bearers some qualitative variation in a quality across a dimension, and
any group of non-distributional properties cannot capture this variation.
Why should we believe that there are fundamentally distributional properties? I can’t conclusively prove their existence here. But some thoughts
are suggestive. The best reason to accept fundamental distributional properties seems to be the difficulty in finding appropriate non-distributional
properties to capture the distributional ones. For instance, consider the
speckled hen. If being speckled is not fundamental, there are some nondistributional properties that jointly capture the speckledness of the hen.
One might think that these non-distributional properties will be the uniform colours of the hen’s body: the patches of brown and white. But these
patches themselves seem, on closer inspection, to be relevantly similar to
distributional properties: they are uniform colours spread over a region of
space. Why is a property that grants uniform colour over a region of space
less problematic than one that grants a non-uniform colour over a region of
space? The former seems a special case of the latter: each provides a distribution of a quality over a dimension, but in the former case this distribution
is less interesting. What we really need for our reduction is properties
that assign properties to things at points, not regions, of space. But then it
becomes more difficult to see how things at points of space could be, for
instance, coloured, or have flow. Fundamentally distributional properties
therefore become more plausible as the only satisfying account of spread of
a quality across a region.27
Accepting that there are irreducibly distributional properties gives us
a solution to the problem of the indiscernibility of identicals for heterogeneous extended simples.28 To summarise, the solution is that extended
simples can have irreducibly distributional properties that imply qualitative variation across space in certain ways. The extended simple is different
in different places by having a single property of a special kind, and this
single property cannot be decomposed into non-distributional ones. The
extended simple has this single property at all locations at which it exists, so satisfies the indiscernibility of identicals, but the property implies
27
As an aside, we can find some further support for the possibility of fundamentally distributional properties from a couple of sources. Firstly, if spacetime is gunky (i.e., if spacetime
is infinitely divisible and has no points), all properties of objects located in this spacetime
will be fundamentally distributional. Secondly, if any properties are emergent in a certain
way (i.e., don’t supervene on the properties of point-sized objects), these properties will also
be fundamentally distributional.
28
See, again, Parsons, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”
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variation so the extended simple is heterogeneous. Thus, the extended
simple can exhibit variation across space without violating the indiscernibility of identicals.29 To give an example: suppose an extended simple is
brown in one region it occupies and white in another. It might seem this
qualitative variation implies that the thing in the first region is distinct
from the thing in the second, due to the indiscernibility of identicals. But
if the extended simple is in fact simply speckled (and irreducibly so), the
thing in the first region and the second region in fact have one and the
same property. Therefore, they needn’t be distinct.
We can translate this, via the analogy between extended simples and
the Trinity, into a solution for the heterogeneity of God across personspace. I’ll focus on the relations of origin. The Father is begetter and the
Son is begotten. In our terms, the occupant of the point of person-space
corresponding to the Father is begetter, and the occupant of the point of
person-space corresponding to the Son is begotten. This might seem to
imply that these occupants are distinct entities, through the indiscernibility
of identicals. But if God in fact simply has an irreducible distributional
generation property, the occupants of the points of person-space in fact
have one and the same property. So they needn’t be distinct after all. Thus,
I claim that there is a single distributional property of generation that the
single entity that is God has. This property gives God qualitative variation. The dimension of variation is person-space (just as the dimension of
variation for an extended simple is space). To repeat: God varies across
person-space in the property of origination that God displays. But this is
not a matter of God being different at different parts of person-space: there
is no property that the entity that the Father is has that the entities that
the Son or Holy Spirit are do not. For these are all the same entity. Rather,
this entity, which is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, has a fundamentally
distributive property that cannot be reduced to non-distributional ones.
The seeming qualitative variation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is
derived from their joint possession (as a numerically identical entity) of
a distributive property. The apparent qualitative variation corresponds
to the qualitative variation encoded by the distributive property across
person-space. More generally, when the Persons seem to differ, the
seeming difference is a result of qualitative variation across person-space
in virtue of some irreducibly distributional property. This means that the
indiscernibility of identicals is not violated.
29
There are, of course, criticisms of the distributional properties solution to the problem
involving heterogeneous extended simples. McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative
Heterogeneity” is a prominent critic. A central worry is that the distributional properties are
underinformative. The speckled hen, for example, remains speckled regardless of where the
speckles are on her body. But, McDaniel argues, the different ways for her to be speckled cannot
be captured if being speckled is a fundamentally distributional property. This issue, while
important, is not relevant for us. This is because the points of physical space that an extended
simple occupies are qualitatively identical, and so distributional properties cannot distinguish
between points of this space. Points of person-space, by contrast, are not qualitatively identical
and hence a fundamental distributional property across this space can be orientated (see the
next paragraph). Thanks to a reviewer for encouraging me to think about this.
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A concern can be raised here about the analogy.30 The relations of origin
seem to encode some sort of priority claim: the Father begets the Son and
the Spirit proceeds from them jointly (in the Western tradition). It might
seem that a distributional property cannot capture this priority, for such a
priority seems to require that the relata of the relation are distinct. There
are options here. One is to take the relations of origin to be relations between the points of person-space, rather than belonging to the entity itself.
As these points are distinct, the relata would be distinct. A second option
is to say that although God necessarily and eternally occupies the three
points of person-space, God’s occupation of s is nevertheless in some sense
dependent upon God’s occupation of f and God’s occupation of h is in
some sense dependent upon God’s occupation of f and s. This dependence
between the occupations of the points of person-space is what the relations of origin are encoding. As all distributional properties grant a certain
sort of variation across a space on their bearer, the sort of variation in this
case is simply that of dependence of occupation. The distributional property in question makes it the case that one and the same thing occupies the
different points of person-space with different levels of priority. On this
second approach, therefore, the relations of origin therefore do not require
distinct relata.
So, we have discussed how the distributional properties approach can
solve the indiscernibility of identicals issue for both the heterogeneous
extended simples and the Trinity. As mentioned, there are alternative explanations are available that ground the claim that extended simples can
be heterogeneous. Three that are especially worth mentioning are the following: (a) relativizing properties to regions of space, (b) taking extended
simples and their stuff to be distinct and (c) using localised trope theory.
I believe that each of these can be translated into appropriate solutions in
the analogue case of the Trinity, but I cannot fully explore this here. Let
me, though, at least indicate how I think this would work for these three
alternatives in turn.
Recall that the problem is how to make sense of extended simples
exhibiting variation in their qualities over the space they occupy. The relativisation approach is roughly the following: the heterogeneous extended
simple bears one property with respect to one region of space and another
property with respect to another. For instance, an extended simple O is
hot with respect to one region of space and cold with respect to another.
The relativiser can maintain this by taking properties themselves to be
relations to regions of space, or by taking the instantiation of properties
to be relative to regions of space. This, in turn, can be motivated by reference to similar temporal relativisation in some endurantist solutions to the
problem of change.31 How does this translate to the parallel worry about
30
My thanks to Mark Murphy for raising this concern, and offering the first of the solutions I mention.
31
See, for instance, Mellor, Real Time, 111–114 and Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary
Intrinsics.” The idea is that properties (or the having of properties) are relative to a time, thus
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variation of the qualities of God across person-space? Well, the Latin Trinitarian can take the properties of origin to include relativisation to parts of
person-space. God is thus “begetter-relative-to-f,” “begotten-relative-to-s,”
and “proceeding-relative-to-h.” This would be the starting point for an
explanation of apparent differences in properties between the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. It is worth noting, though, that such relativizing might be
dependent on a substantivalist understanding of person-space, rather than
the deflationary view I adopted above.32
The second approach, advocated by Markosian, involves making a
distinction between things and stuff and, in particular, between an object
and the stuff of which it is made.33 An extended simple, on this view, is a
simple object but is constituted by certain matter. This matter is not simple,
but rather has parts. The bearer of the properties which vary across space,
for Markosian, are the portions of stuff, rather than the extended simple.
Because these portions are distinct from one another, the indiscernibility
of identicals worry can’t get off the ground. The central move, then, in
Markosian’s solution is to identify the bearers of the properties as stuff,
not things.
Translating this into the Trinitarian case is more complicated than in
the other solutions, and I am more tentative about its success. But the central move, again, is to identify the bearers of the properties of origin as
distinct from the entity that is God. One candidate is the points of personspace themselves, a possibility mentioned above.34 Because the points of
person-space are distinct, if they are the bearers of the varying properties
then no problem from the indiscernibility of identicals arises. Again, as
in the previous solution, an approach along these lines might be more
conducive to a Latin Trinitarian who took a more ontologically robust
view of the points of person-space that I have done in this paper.35 This
is because Markosian explicitly relies on an ontology that doesn’t reduce
things to stuff or vice versa (called the “Mixed Ontology”). The parallel
avoiding the charge that when an object changes one and the same thing has incompatible
properties.
32
Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out. The issue is that substantivalism about time
and space makes much more plausible the relativisation to them posited by certain endurantist and extended simple solutions respectively (argument to this effect in the endurance case
can be found in Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 113 ff. I don’t find this totally convincing, but
here is not the place to say why (though see also n11 above). My own views on endurance
and change, at least, do not require this (see Pickup, “A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of
Theseus Puzzle” for some indicative material). At any rate, the pairing of a substantivalist
view of person-space with relativisation to that space is not something I am ruling out. As I
have said, though, I prefer the pairing of anti-substantivalism about person-space and fundamental distributional properties (which do not require relativisation).
33
See Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People,” which spells out further some
thoughts from his “Simples.”
34
Another option is to take God to be in some sense composed of divine “matter,” distinct
from the divine thing. This matter would be complex, with exactly three parts (corresponding
to the Persons). This is suggestive but not something I’ll investigate here.
35
See §2 above.
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here would be the irreducibility of points of person-space to entities (and
vice versa).
However, there’s still more work to do before a Markosian-style solution to the Trinitarian case is established. In the extended simple case,
there is a relation of constitution between the stuff and the things. What is
the parallel relation for the Trinity? Not constitution, as the divine is not
constituted by points of person-space. Perhaps it is simply the occupation
relation. But it’s not at all obvious how the occupation relation would do
the required job. So more work would need to be done to develop such a
Markosian-style account. I will therefore only tentatively propose that a
solution along these lines is worth investigating further.
The third alternative is to take the properties that are ascribed to the
extended simple as tropes of a specific sort. Tropes are particulars, rather
than universals, and give certain qualities to their bearers. The claim of
this solution is that an extended simple has localised tropes: O has both
the “hot at s” trope and the “cold at s*” trope.36 These tropes do not resemble, but they are not contradictory either. So the extended simple
displays the variation by having non-resembling localised tropes that are
local to the different parts of space that it occupies. (One might wonder
about a connection to the first, relativizing approach here.) Similarly, the
Trinitarian can make use of tropes with circumscribed locations in personspace. For instance, the relations of origin can be taken to be tropes that are
local within this space: God has both the local-to-point-of-person-space-f
begetter trope and the non-resembling local-to-point-of-person-space-s
begotten trope. As tropes which are local to those points of person-space,
these can be jointly held by a single thing, so the indiscernibility of identicals is not violated.
I have explicitly not investigated these candidate solutions in detail,
either as applied to heterogeneous extended simples or to the Trinity. But I
hope to have indicated how work in the literature in the former case carry
over to the latter. Thus, the defence of the Latin Trinity against the indiscernibility of identicals worry is heavily indebted to discussion of how
to accommodate variation in the extended simples literature. Although
I prefer the distributional properties view, if any such explanation is coherent then there may be a translation into the Trinitarian case.37 I conclude
that we have the resources to avoid the charge that the numerical identity
account proposed fails to capture the relations of origin that obtain within
the Godhead.
The Metaphysical Status of the Persons
There is a fourth worry that might follow from the above discussion.
The appeal to distributional properties might make us concerned about
36
This is how McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity” develops the
solution. It draws on a similar solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics outlined by
Ehring, “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics, and Momentary Tropes.”
37
As noted above, it would take further work to establish this for Markosian’s solution.
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the status of the Persons of the Trinity. I’ll show this worry via extended
simples.
Imagine an extended simple rod, R.38 Imagine, further, that R is red in
one continuous half of the spatial region it occupies and blue in the other
continuous half of the spatial region it occupies. The concern in the last
section was that it seems as though what is located at one half of the spatial region and what is located at the other half have different properties.
But if R is an extended simple then there is just one entity located at these
regions, which cannot have different properties from itself. To resolve this
initial issue, we say that R has a single, irreducibly distributional property
of being red-and-blue-in-the-appropriate-ways. Contrast this description
of the extended simple case with what is happening in a normal case. Normally, we would say that R has a red half and a blue half. But we are not
allowed to say this in the extended simple case as R is a simple. Speaking
with metaphysical rigour, therefore, there is no such thing as a half of R.
What there is, instead, is a region of space at which R is located which is
where R is red.
Now we turn to the Trinity. The Son is begotten. What does this mean,
in metaphysical rigour? It does not mean that there is an entity that is the
Son, and that this entity is begotten simpliciter. For the entity occupying
the relevant person-space is God, who is not begotten simpliciter. Rather,
it means that there is a region of person-space such that it is occupied
by God and God is begotten there. God has the irreducible distributional
property of divine origin, and the way God has this heterogeneous property in the region of person-space corresponding to the second Person is
what it is for the second Person to be begotten. But, much as we cannot
in metaphysical rigour talk of the red half of R, we cannot speak of the
Son part of God. In metaphysical rigour, we can talk of the occupant of
a point of person-space ( = God), and also of a point of person-space. We
have the entity, God, and the three points of person-space God occupies, f,
s and h. A single entity is each of the Persons of the Trinity. But in talking
of the distinctness of the Persons, we are not speaking of their numerical
distinctness. Rather, we are referring to the points of person-space so occupied by God. The lesson from this is that the terms “Father,” “Son,” and
“Spirit” (and their cognates) refer to God when speaking of an entity, but
can also be used to refer to different categories of thing, namely points of
person-space. God belongs to the category of entities. Points in personspace, by contrast, are not entities. This may be unpalatable to some: they
may be disconcerted that we can, using the term “Father,” refer not to an
entity but to a way of being a person. This, I take it, is a cost of the theory.
Necessary Co-extension of Persons and Entities
A fifth worry is connected to this, and denies that there is such a distinction between persons and entities. A disputant might argue as follows:
38

I am grateful to Dani Kodaj for this example, and the point it makes.
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It is clear that persons and entity are numerically identical. When I
talk about Hillary Clinton, I am talking about the entity that is Hillary
Clinton and the person Hillary Clinton: they are one and the same
thing. One way to characterise this is to assert that persons are a subcategory of entities (as are, e.g., animals, artefacts, subatomic particles
and planets). But I don’t even need this assertion; I merely need it to be
the case that persons and entities cannot be separated. So the notion of
person-space is otiose: it is exactly isomorphic to a sub-region of the
space generated by assigning each entity a point.
The disputant is right that I need this distinction between persons and
entities, for I claim that in the Trinity there is only one entity, but three
persons. Hence I take it that counting by entities and counting by persons
are different, and, more importantly, that what it is to be a particular entity
is not the same as what it is to be a particular person.39 But I don’t think
that the disputant’s position is as obvious as it is presented. Though I have
made my task deliberately difficult by using a notion of personhood that
is generic, it worth remembering that the doctrinal texts do not force us to
hold that the “Persons” need satisfy philosophical analyses of the contemporary notion of personhood. Thus even if “persons” in the contemporary
usage implies identity of entity, it may not in the theological usage.
But more ambitiously, I think the putative possible cases like that of
Jekyll and Hyde might make us doubt the identity claim even in the case
of human persons. Given that what I am seeking to do is make a conceptual
distinction between person-structure and entity-structure, to rule this out
the disputant needs to not only show that persons and entities are related
one-to-one in actuality, but that they must be. In other words, not only that
person-space and a region of entity-space are isomorphic when considering actual persons and entities, but also when considering all possible
persons and entities. The onus, I feel, is on the disputant to establish this.
Presumably establishing this would be done by giving an account of personhood (and, indeed, of entities), the satisfactory completion of which
would be no mean feat.
Lack of Novelty
Finally, even a sympathetic reader may worry that what I am presenting
here is no real advance in our understanding, as it adds nothing to the
Latin Trinitarian approach spelt out in detail by Brian Leftow in various
places. In response, I’d like to point to a few things I think this analogy does
add, but first it is worth a brief sketch of Leftow’s view in order to make
the relevant contrasts clear.
39
If counting by persons and counting by entities gives different results, this might seem
to suggest my solution is a variant of a relative identity view. But this isn’t actually so. If I
see three of the same brand of car, counting by cars and counting by brands of car will give
different results. This doesn’t require relative identity, but just that cars and brands of car are
not in a one-to-one correspondence. Thanks to Mark Murphy for highlighting this possible
concern.
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Leftow presents an account of the Trinity that belongs in the same category as that defended in this paper: a Latin approach. That is, his view is
one that maintains the strict identity of the Persons with God and therefore has the task of explaining what the distinctions between the Persons
consists in. For Leftow, God is just one thing but has three distinguishable
“life streams”: these are what correspond to the Persons. So there is a life
of the Father, a life of the Son and a life of the Spirit: these are distinct
lives and contain distinct conscious events but all belong to a single entity. A parallel Leftow draws is with an imagined case of time-travel: the
time-traveller might be simultaneously living different parts of the life
of a single thing. Similarly, the Father, Son and Spirit are all numerically
identical to God, but God’s life has the curious form that it is composed
of three simultaneous strands. Unlike in the time-travel case, God’s life
strands are not sequential.
Thus, Leftow’s account has significant connections to the one I present
here. However, as mentioned, I believe there to be some key differences.
In order of increasing importance, they are:
a)

At the very least, the analogy with extended simples offers a different way to approach the Latin Trinitarian theory. The analogy
with extended simples is a helpful one, in that it clarifies the distinction between the entity that is located at points of person-space
and the points of person-space themselves. The parallel with the
separation of the mereological and spacetime location structure of
extended simples helps to warrant such a distinction.

b)

Leftow’s account of the Trinity takes the Persons’ identities to be
event-based: it is the events of their lives that individuate and distinguish the Persons.40 My approach is more flexible: it is neutral on
what the Persons of the Trinity are and how they are to be characterised. These will depend on the precise character of personhood
(and hence of person-space). By occupying a point of person-space,
entities are particular persons. Thus, entities are the things that are
people, but counting by entities and counting by persons can give
different results. But this leaves open both the metaphysical category to which persons belong and the means of characterising
persons. It therefore doesn’t require that the Persons of the Trinity are understood as event-based (though they can be understood
in this way). My account is thus more general than Leftow’s, and
allows the Trinitarian more resources for answering the difficult
question of what the Persons are. Leftow’s original account may be
easily adaptable to accommodate wider possibilities, but here it is
explicit that a Latin Trinitarian approach doesn’t entail an eventbased view of the identity of the Persons.

40

Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 315.
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c)

Thirdly, the approach doesn’t require the metaphysical (or conceptual) possibility of time-travel. (Perhaps Leftow’s doesn’t either.41)
So if you’re uncomfortable with time-travel, you might still accept
the analogy offered here. On the other hand, of course, extended
simples are controversial, so perhaps some are more inclined to
accept the possibility of time-travel than of extended simples. At
any rate, a second, logically independent analogy bolsters the case.
Furthermore, the central work done by Leftow’s time-travel analogy is to give us a case of multilocation: multilocation provides the
conceptual grip on the Latin Trinity he advocates. While extended
simple cases can be thought of as instances of multilocation (where
the object is fully located at each of the points of space it can be
found), they do not have to be. For instance, extended simples could
be only partially located at each of the points of space where they
can be found, and fully located only at the combination of these.42
Similarly, although the above has been tacitly framed in terms of
multilocation, God could be located at the relevant three points of
person-space only partially, and fully located only at their sum. I
myself do not favour this view, but it shows the independence of
the Latin Trinitarian approach from the possibility of multilocation.
What matters, rather, is the different structures of entities and person-space. The account here presented therefore does not, unlike
Leftow’s, rely on multilocation.

d) Finally, the extended simples literature gives us a series of neat
options for solving the problem of the indiscernibility of identicals and the different relations of origin within the Godhead for a
view that asserts the numerical identity of God with Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. These options correspond to the solutions to the
parallel problem of heterogeneous extended simples. I’ve outlined
the position I find most appealing, namely irreducible distributive
properties, but it is a major benefit to the Latin approach that there
are these further metaphysical resources already developed that
can be explored.
5. Conclusion
I have here presented an analogy between extended simples and the
Trinity, more specifically between the way that extended simples occupy
space and the way that God is distinct persons. The analogy relies on a
notion of “person-space.” I believe this analogy strengthens the Latin
Trinitarian approach by showing the distinction between entity- and
person-structure, and hence the possibility of these coming apart in the
divine. The analogy helps to show how a Latin Trinity can maintain both
41
42

See Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 309–311 for discussion.
For this “spanner” approach see, e.g., McDaniel, “Extended Simples.”
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the numerical identity of God with the Persons (understood as occupants
of person-space) and the numerical distinctness of the Persons (understood as locations in person-space). It might also give pause to those who
are willing to take extended simples metaphysically seriously but are not
willing to do the same in the case of the Trinity.43
New College, Oxford
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